Abstract: The diagnosis of a migration crisis has prompted multiple processes of rebordering in Europe and beyond. These include the build-up of physical barriers like walls and fences, the tightening of asylum regimes, the expansion of biometric databases and the enrolment of authoritarian regimes in controlling Europe's borders. These developments have prompted a revival of the image of the 'fortress' in critical accounts of the European border regime. Building on existing criticisms of the metaphor Fortress Europe, this article proposes an alternative political imaginary of the European border regime. Starting from a version of the autonomy of migration approach that is based on the notion of appropriation, it proposes to apprehend the European border regime as a parasitic and precarious apparatus of capture. This apparatus of capture tries to recuperate migrants' practices of appropriation in order to turn the knowledge and creativity of these practices into a driving force for its own development. Important aspects of this dynamic are illustrated through two examples: the refinement of control mechanisms of the European visa regime and the repeated tightening of Germany's asylum regime since the 'summer of migration' in 2015. Taken together, these examples illustrate three aspects of processes of recuperation: first, that legal changes often only formalise previously informal practices of recuperation, secondly, that the framing of migration in terms of crisis functions as a vehicle for processes of recuperation which open up, thirdly, new opportunities for practices of appropriation as they are incoherent. In sum, the reading of the European border regime as an apparatus of capture paves the way for more assertive antiracist politics as it invites us to apprehend increasingly violent forms of border control not as signs of strengths of the European border regime, but as indicators of its increasingly desperate fight for survival.
'To write against the statist imaginary is thus intended as an act of resistance -though admittedly not the bravest act of resistance one might imagine, since the state aims to dominate the thought of even those who oppose it (indeed one might even say especially those who oppose it).
[…] One of the implications of this is that the statist political imagination has assisted the state in setting limits on the theoretical imagination, acting as a block on the possibility of conceiving of a society beyond the state' (Neocleous 2003: 6) .
If one compares contemporary media accounts and images of migration to the European Union (EU) with those of the 'long summer of migration' in 2015 (Kasparek and Speer 2015) , when hundreds of thousands of migrants travelled unauthorised via the Balkan route to Northern Europe, the contrast is striking. In 2015 images and media accounts of migrants predominate. These images of ever more laborious and increasingly violent forms of border control are often interpreted as evidence for a 'Fortress Europe in the making' (Jünemann, Scherer, and Fromm 2017) . Indeed, the image of the fortress experiences a revival in light of the EU's efforts to restore the public's trust in the European border regime. Particularly the proliferation of walls and other physical barriers across Europe has contributed to the resurgence of the metaphor of the fortress in critical accounts of the European border regime (e.g. Amnesty
International 2014, Carr 2012 , Connolly 2015 . The image of the fortress also proliferates in slogans and leaflets of the antiracist movement.
ii It is also not absent from academic works (e.g. Follis 2012 , Jones 2016 , Jünemann, Scherer, and Fromm 2017 , Roos 2013 .
What dominates in academic debates are, however, more nuanced conceptions of border regimes. To highlight the link between global inequality and the proliferation of border controls, Fabian Georgi (2017) diagnoses, for instance, the emergence of a dystopian 'fortress capitalism' in which islands of relative prosperity are defended like a fortress against the 'wretched of the Earth'. The European border regime has also been likened to a selective filter that renders Europe as a 'gated community' (Van Houtum and Pijpers 2007) . Or it is depicted as a banopticon that does not aim at the repression of mobility but at its institutionalisation through the creation of a satellite population that is always kept 'in orbit' i.e. at a distance and on the move (Bigo 2007) . What all these images share is that they are based on the assumption that the EU and its member states can regulate migration as they please. This assumption has however been revealed as a myth by the 'summer of migration' 2015 when nearly one million migrants entered Europe unauthorized. What is needed are therefore alternative imaginations of the European border regime that convey its imperfection, precarity and 'productive failure' (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008: 166) , which results in the refinement of existing logics and mechanisms of control, rather than their radical overhaul or abandonment.
Hence, this article seeks to develop an alternative imaginary that does not overrate, like the images outlines above, the coherence and efficiency of the European border regime. This is important because how we imagine the European border regime has practical consequences.
It shapes how we evaluate its operational logic and its effectiveness. It also affects how we assess migrants' capacity to subvert mechanisms of regulation and control. This is why Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson rightly critique the metaphor of the fortress for 'driv[ing] the political imagination in a too linear way onto mechanisms of control and domination' (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 165) . For a political imaginary conveys, according to the social theorist Susan Buck-Morss (2002: 12) , not only a particular political logic, but also 'a political landscape, a concrete visual field in which political actors are positioned.' Hence, political imaginaries are political in and of themselves. They affect political agendas and practices by shaping how we envision the actors, issues and problems that are associated with the entity that is imagined in a particular way. This is because political imaginaries carry certain, mostly tacit assumptions about the entity they are meant to convey and elucidate. The following three sections therefore develop a reading of the European border regime as a parasitic and precarious apparatus of capture. This apparatus of capture tries to recuperate the practices by which migrants try to appropriate mobility to Europe in order to turn them into a driving force for the refinement of the means and methods of regulation and control. In this way the article advances the reading of migration as a 'constituent force', which has been developed by the autonomy of migration literature (Andrijasevic 2010, Karakayali and Rigo 2010) . It demonstrates, in brief, that we can actually observe a dynamic between migratory practices and their recuperation by the European border regime on the level of concrete tactics of appropriation of particular migrant subjects and not just the abstract level of migration.
This argument will be developed in three moves. The first section outlines a reading of the autonomy of migration approach (AoM) which is based on the idea that migrants, rather than openly contesting border controls, tend to silently appropriate mobility by repurposing the mechanisms of control into means of appropriation. Subsequently it explains how this version of the AoM permits us to read the European border regime as a parasitic apparatus of capture.
The second section illustrates the dynamic of migrants' practices of appropriation and their recuperation by the border regime through an analysis of the refinement of control mechanisms in consulates in North Africa. This analysis is based on a multi-sited ethnography that studied migrants' encounters with the Visa Information System (VIS), one of the largest biometric databases in the world, to assess how migrants appropriate mobility to Europe within biometric border regimes. The final section turns to the legislative overhaul of Germany's asylum regime since the 'migration crisis' in 2015 to highlight three aspects of processes of recuperation: first, that legal changes often only formalise previously informal practices of recuperation, secondly, that the framing of migration in terms of crisis functions as a vehicle for processes of recuperation which are, thirdly, incoherent and produce new possibilities for the appropriation of mobility as they are disputed in a contested policy arena. First, the image of the fortress overrates the efficiency of the European border regime.
Abandoning Fortress Europe: Thinking beyond the dungeon of antiracist politics
By denying the relative autonomy that the AoM's proponents attribute to migration the image of the fortress would misrepresent the European border regime as an omnipotent control apparatus (Panagiotidis and Tsianos 2007) . The AoM's advocates emphasise in contrast migrants' capacity to subvert border controls. This is why they conceive of Europe's borders not as the impenetrable walls, but as sites of struggles over mobility and rights (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 183) . Hence, they argue that the imagination of the European border regime as a fortress is based on a control biased analysis that only focuses on the means and methods of control while largely ignoring migrants' proven capacity to render Europe's borders porous (Scheel 2013a ).
Secondly, the AoM's proponents discard the political imaginary of Fortress Europe as misleading because it does not account for the productivity of border regimes which do not aim at the repression but at the valorisation of human mobility (Mezzadra 2011) . To abandon the paradigm of exclusion that informs the imaginary of the fortress, the AoM's advocates argue that the European border regime follows a rationale of differential inclusion. This concept highlights the 'hierarchizing and stratifying capacity' (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 7) of border regimes which facilitate the gradual disenfranchisement of migrants. Working visa that tie a migrant's residence title to the duration of the working contract make the visa holder, for instance, vulnerable to blackmailing by the employer, thus creating labour relations that are unfree insofar as they feature coercive forces other than the economic need of selling one's labour power (Moulier Boutang 1998).
Thirdly, the image of the fortress attributes too much coherence, or even a systemic logic, to migration policy and border controls (Karakayali and Tsianos 2007: 12) . Migration with the others and thereby calls for a re-adjustment or a re-working of the heterogeneous elements that surface at various points ' (1980 [1977]: 194-195) .
Finally, AoM scholars criticise the metaphor of the fortress because it is interrelated with the imagination 'of the migrant as a weak subject […] in need of care and assistance […]' (Mezzadra 2005: 46) . One factor explaining the continued popularity of the image of Fortress Europe seems to be that it creates, like any political imaginary a set of relational subject positions, 'a political landscape […] in which political actors are positioned' (Buck-Morss 2002: 12). These include, besides the migrant as a weak subject in need of support, the 'evil' border guard as a stand-in for the fortress-like European border regime and, finally, the 'good' humanitarian aid-worker providing assistance to migrants or heroic antiracist activist fighting against an allegedly all-powerful border regime. In this way the imagination of the European border regime as a well-guarded fortress facilitates paternalistic proxy policies as pursued by many humanitarian organisations as well as some antiracist groups (Mitropoulos 2007 ).
Thus, the imagination of the European border regime as a fortress operates as a kind of dungeon for antiracists politics. Due to the control biased analysis that underpins the political imaginary of the fortress, and the related blindness to migrants' capacity to subvert border controls, the Fortress Europe discourse cannot but make the features of allegedly omnipotent border regimes the starting point for political campaigns and demands (Bojadžijev, Karakayali, and Tsianos 2001) . Hence, the political imagination of the fortress results in campaigns and demands that tend to be defensive, reformist and reactive insofar as they appeal to governments on moral grounds to attenuate the restrictive effects of allegedly omnipotent border regimes.
The following attempt of developing an alternative political imaginary of the European border regime should therefore be understood as a response to a challenge that has already been formulated, more than a decade ago, by members of the research group Transit Migration.
They regard the persistence of the inadequate and politically counter-productive metaphor of the fortress primarily as 'an expression of the difficulty to grasp the turbulence of migration' (Karakayali and Tsianos 2007: 13) . Hence, they call for the imagination 'of a representational arrangement in which migrations change societies rather than simply bouncing off' (13).
To develop such an alternative political imaginary this article starts from the conception of 'migration as a constituent force in the production of the European polity and citizenship' (Andrijasevic 2010: 162) . Migration operates as a constituent force in the development of the European border regime insofar as 'migrants, even when formally (i.e. legally) excluded from citizenship, are politically included in its domain to the extent that they contest the existing territorial distribution of membership and compel the legal and political space to reorganise itself around human mobility' (Karakayali and Rigo 2010: 127) . This is why AoM scholars regard migration as 'the dynamic moment in a migration regime' (Karakayali and Tsianos 2005: 50) . Rather than as weak subjects, migrants emerge as non-negligible protagonists in the development of the European border regime as their practices regularly escape and exceed the control capacities of the existing border regime, forcing the latter into a process of adaptation and reorganisation (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008: 77-78 ).
However, this stance does not imply an undifferentiated celebration of migrant agency, in which autonomy is misunderstood as pure self-legislation or unrestricted self-determination free of any effects of practices of government. Quite to the contrary, migrants' practices are shaped by the mechanisms and methods of control that they seek to recode into means of appropriation, as I explain below. Moreover, migrants are not able to usurp the mechanisms of control completely for their purposes. This is why practices of appropriation afford concessions and compromises on behalf of migrants and result in outcomes that are polyvalent, partial and contested. The successful entering of Europe via a Schengen visa that has been appropriated via manipulated documents supporting a fictive biography of a well-to-do traveler does, for instance, not signal an unequivocal victory over the European border regime. It rather results in a compromise: living and working in Europe as a 'visa-overstayer' are possible, but only under the precarious conditions of illegality and deportability. (Scheel 2018, forthcoming) .
The crucial point is that migrants' practices of appropriation feature, despite these polyvalent and contested outcomes, moments of uncontrollability and excess that escape the capacities of existing mechanisms of control. And it is these moments of uncontrollability and excess that force the European border regime to reorganize and adapt the means and methods of regulation and control by trying to recuperate migrants' practices of appropriation. In this way the notion of appropriation refines the reading of migration as a constituent force as it permits us to locate the capacity of migratory practices to instigate transformation processes not only in an abstract social process -migration -but in concrete practices of appropriation of embodied migrant subjects. Consequently, contemporary mechanisms of border control emerge as recuperated forms of practices that were previously successfully mobilized by migrants to appropriate mobility (Shukaitis 2009: 48) .
In general, the concept of appropriation highlights the intricate interwovenness of migrants' practices with the devices, methods and logics of control as it is based on the idea that migrants try to recode the latter into means allowing for the appropriation of mobility (Scheel 2018, forthcoming) . For practices of appropriation follow a rationale of repurposing.
Due to the asymmetrical power relations that characterise situations of border control, migrants are usually not in a position to openly challenge the actors and methods of control. Instead of openly contesting the rules and regulations of border regimes, practices of appropriation simulate compliance with the former, but only to clandestinely subvert them. In other words, practices of appropriation operate -like the tactics described by Michel de Certeau (1984: 37) -in an environment they do not own. They resemble manoeuvres 'within enemy territory' (37).
The repurposing of the means and methods of control is possible because migrants are implicated in the control of their mobility not only as passive objects, but also as acting subjects because the capacity of border regimes to regulate human mobility derives from, but also hinges on, the active participation of those whose mobility they are designed to govern. In consulates staff ask visa applicants for instance numerous questions and demand various documents to assess their 'will to return' to their country of origin. But the visa applicants are the ones who provide the answers and documents.
This article is however concerned with another important aspect of the intricate intertwinement of migrants' practices of appropriation with the means and methods of control.
In brief, the former shape -via their recuperation through the border regime -the development of the latter. Put simply, practices of appropriation are enmeshed in a dynamic of subversion of and recuperation by the border regime. In contrast to de Certeau's idea of tactics, the notion of appropriation underscores that this 'art of the weak ' (1984: 34) is not without effect on the border regime. Migrants' practices of appropriation emerge as the 'ghost in the machine' that animates the refinement of the mechanisms of control and the constant reorganisation of the border regime as a whole. The latter emerges as a precarious and parasitic apparatus of capture that leeches on the knowledge and creativity that is engrained in migrants' practices of appropriation, as the next section illustrates through an account of the development of the mechanisms of control deployed in consulates of EU member states.
Apprehending the European border regime as a parasitic apparatus of capture
One afternoon, I am sitting with M in his back office. M is the visa section's head of a consulate representing an EU member state in a country in North Africa (hereafter: consulate Z). He is processing visa applications from the past few days. This is a tiresome bureaucratic routine, largely determined by the computer software. Before M can mark a file as complete, the software searches four different databases, using as search criteria the first three letters of the applicant's name and, in the case of the VIS, the applicant's biometric data. Besides the VIS, the software also searches the Schengen Information System (SIS), the local 'black list' and a 'national list' containing data about all applications received worldwide by the visa sections of the country which consulate Z represents. practices of appropriation in this conflictive dialogue of actions. Since the VIS also stores the digitized fingerprints of rejected visa applicants for a period of five years, consular staff can now check through a search in this biometric database 'if this fingerprint has already applied for a visa', as a border guards put it in an interview. Hence, the VIS can be read as a 'negative result' of previously successful practices of appropriation (Negri [1977 : 242).
This example illustrates that migrants' border struggles impose the need on the border regime to constantly adapt, update and refine existing mechanisms of regulation and control.
Practices of appropriation that exceed and escape the capacities of existing control mechanisms are translated, via their stigmatisation in terms of 'fraud' and 'deceit' through pejorative labels such as 'visa shopping', in a call for more and 'better' border security practices and technologies to tame the allegedly excessive agency of migrants. In this way migrants are framed as cunning tricksters using all kinds of ruses to get a visa to Europe. What is concealed by this 'trickster narrative' is however that it is the highly restrictive Schengen visa regime that provoke practices of appropriation in the first place. In general, the Schengen visa regime renders mobility to Europe as a scarce resource through the introduction of an entry ticket whose receipt is subject to the fulfilment of numerous requirements that do not correspond to the living and working conditions of most of the people who are subjected to a visa requirement. Hence, the visa regime resembles a machine of illegalization that entices the former to engage in delinquent practices like 'visa shopping' or 'document fraud' (cf. Scheel 2017b). Migrants' attempts to appropriate visa are subsequently mobilised -via their framing in terms of 'fraud' and betrayal' -as evidence for the claimed need to refine and expand existing mechanisms of control. Foucault (1980 Foucault ( [1977 : 195) describes this dynamic as the 'strategic elaboration' of the security dispositif. Ultimately, the European border regime emerges as a parasitic apparatus of capture that works through the recuperation of practices of appropriation which are provoked by the very raison d'etre of this security dispositif to render mobility to Europe a scarce and precious resource.
In this context it is crucial to note that the practices and technologies evolving from processes of recuperation are informed by the knowledge and modus operandi of the practices of appropriation they seek to capture and foreclose. In the example above the usage of biometric technologies for tracing rejected visa applicants responds to the latter's tactic to conceal previous rejections through the usage of new passports that do not bear a stamp signaling a negative decision by another consulate. Since a paper document can be manipulated or replaced by migrants in order to be recoded from a device of control into a means of appropriation, the border regime seeks to recuperate this practice of appropriation by resorting to a device of control migrants will find difficult to temper with: their own bodies which are used as 'an indisputable anchor to which data can be safely secured' (Amoore 2006: 342) . Just as Mario Tronti describes the automation of industrial production in the 1970s as 'successive attempts of the capitalist class to emancipate itself from the working class' (Tronti 1979b) , we can understand this instance of technologisation as an attempt to emancipate the border regime from migrants' capacity to act by rendering their very bodies as a means of control.
The example of practices stigmatised as 'corruption' illustrates, in turn, that practices of appropriation sometimes even shape the entire organisational and architectural structure of institutions of border control. The frequency with which 'visa scandals' are discovered indicates that the relationship between the visa regime and corruption is as 'paradoxical' as the 'the state-smuggler relationship' described by Peter Andreas (2000: 22) . Corruption is pursued by the state, whose laws and regulations create the incentives and conditions for its existence in the first place. What is peculiar to this mode of appropriation is that it relies on the recoding of the agents of control into brokers of mobility (cf. Scheel 2018, forthcoming) . What interests us here are the anti-corruption measures that have been implemented in consulates. They include the introduction of the 'four eye-principle' in the decision-making procedure. In consulate Z, which harbours a medium-sized visa section, members of staff receiving applicants never decide on visa applications, but can only influence their outcome through an 'advice' they provide in the electronic file. The decision is taken by M who works in the backoffice and is never in direct contact with the applicants. In large visa sections, which receive hundreds of applications every day the processing of visa applications is subdivided into numerous small tasks. In his study on a large French visa section Alexis Spire has aptly invoked the image of an assembly line to capture this division of the processing of visa applications into multiple minor tasks executed in constant repetition by specialised staff who are nevertheless subjected to a rotation scheme (2009: 93) . The official reason for these measures, which shape the organisational structure of visa sections, is the prevention of corruption (Gouteyron 2007 : 53, Spire 2009 . What these anti-corruption measures illustrate is that it is 'by means of a continual theft of the [knowledge] generated by [migrants'] struggles' that border regimes 'create increasingly complex mechanisms of domination' (Negri [1982 ).
Recuperation through crisis-talk: protecting the asylum regime from refugees
The history of the transformation of Germany's asylum regime is a history of recuperation of migrants' practices of appropriation. This history began in 1993. In that year the constitution was changed to restrict access to asylum, which had become the main channel of entry after the end of the guest worker regime with the so-called recruitment stop in 1973. In the absence of other legal migration options 'labour migrants in the 1970s and 1980s had to invent stories of "political persecution"' to appropriate entry to and residence in Germany (Karakayali and Rigo 2010) . In 1993 access to the asylum procedure was restricted through the introduction of the requirement that only people who had not entered Germany from an EU member state or another 'safe third country' could apply. These heavily contested changes took place in context of a surge of Neo-Nazi attacks on reception centers for asylum seekers. Critics accused the government therefore of rewarding the violent 'politics of the street' of the far-right. Lehnert 2017). It shows that, to achieve this overall objective, the proposed measures aim at the recuperation of migrants' practices of appropriation. Based on this analysis I will elaborate three important aspects of processes of recuperation.
Nearly all law packages feature measures aiming at a more 'efficient' enforcement of deportations of rejected asylum seekers. They seek to address the so-called 'deportation-gap'
-the divergence between the number of migrants issued with a return order and the much smaller number of people who are actually deported (Gibney and Hansen 2003) . (Gillespie et al. 2016: 23) . Following media reports it was the circulation of a tweet by the BAMF on the temporary suspension of the Dublin regulation in social networks which prompted migrants to start the 'march of hope' (Ullrich 2017) . The attempt to recuperate migrants' digital literacy for purposes of control confirms that smartphones and social media are ambivalent means of appropriation since the data traces migrants leave behind 'make them vulnerable to […] unwanted state surveillance' (Gillespie et al. 2016: 9) .
One of the most contested legal changes concerns the suspension of family reunification for a period of two years for people with 'subsidiary protection'. Since the introduction of this clause by AP2 the BAMF only grants subsidiary protection, instead of full refugee status, to asylum seekers from Syria. This measure responds to the tactic to send one family member on the expensive and demanding journey to Europe so that this pioneer can appropriate mobility to Europe for others by applying for family reunification. Hence, the restriction of family reunification will certainly generate 'a vast new business area for smugglers' (Lehnert 2017) .
Taken together, these transformations of the German asylum regime illustrate three important aspects of processes of recuperation. First, legal changes may constitute the final, but by no means a necessary step of processes of recuperation. The legal changes permitting authorities to search migrants' data carriers only formalise a highly intrusive practice that had already been established on the informal level in local migration administrations (ANA-ZAR 2010) . This example confirms that processes of recuperation are mostly initiated by street-level bureaucrats who develop informal practices that aim at the recuperation of migrants' practices of appropriation (Scheel 2017a) . In many cases such practices are never formalised through legal changes, but rather become virulent on the street-level of policy implementation. The most adequate method to account for these informal practices, and the tactics of appropriation by which they are shaped and informed, is the ethnographic study of migrants' embodied encounters with the means and methods of control (Scheel 2013b ).
Secondly, debates on the measures outlined above illustrate that 'crisis-talk' operates as a vehicle for processes of recuperation. The debate on the restriction of family reunification was for instance dominated by fear-mongering prognoses predicting 'another migration crisis' that would exceed the allegedly already exhausted 'reception capacities of Germany'.
According to these highly speculative predictions every refugee would bring three or more family members to Germany by applying for family reunification (Meiritz and Elmer 2015) .
This example demonstrates that the framing of migration in terms of '"crisis" […] appears to be precisely a device for the authorization of exceptional or "emergency" governmental measures -and their normalization -towards the ends of enhanced and expanded border enforcement and immigration policing' (De Genova et al. 2016) . What explains its capacity to facilitate processes of recuperation is that the term crisis denotes 'a marked discontinuity', a disruption of the status quo (Lindley 2014: 2) . Hence, the framing of migration events in terms of crisis generates an imperative to act that justifies the implementation of more and 'better' mechanisms of border control. This explains why 'crisis labelling in relation to migration has emerged over the past two decades as a routine practice in European governmental arenas' Finally, recuperation resembles an active process of innovation whose outcome is not determined in advance. This is because processes of recuperation are neither fully determined by the modus operandi of the practices of appropriation they seek to capture, nor are they underpinned by a unified strategy. The European border regime is and remains a fractured and heterogeneous security dispositif whose functional overdetermination also characterises the constant repair work invested in its development. The question of how to harness migrants' practices of appropriation is disputed in a contested policy arena in which a multiplicity of actors compete with one another over influence, competence and funding. This is why logics of securitization, economization, marketization, humanitarization etc. intersect and conflict within processes of recuperation, producing contradictory outcomes and incoherent policies.
The five law packages mentioned above include, for instance, a variety of changes that point towards the infusion of an economic utilitarianism in the asylum regime that sometimes counters their overall restrictive impetus (Scherschel 2016) . For instance, AP1 opens the labour market for temporary agency work to asylum seekers, while the LOI ties receipt of a permanent residence permit for recognized refugees to successful economic performance (Lehnert 2017 ).
The functional overdetermination and fragmentation of the European border regime also explains why the recuperation of migrants' practices of appropriation does not culminate in watertight controls or a 'fortress in the making'. Rather than insurmountable mechanisms of control, processes of recuperation generate ad-hoc measures and compromised policies that roll and tumble over each other, inescapably creating un-intended side-effects, inconsistencies and tensions, which open up new possibilities for practices of appropriation. The attempt to turn migrants' use of smart phones and social media into a source of surveillance and control opens up the possibility to appropriate refugee status through the provision of doctored mobile phones that contain pictures of alleged countries of origin and travel routes which provide evidence for a convincing story of prosecution (Rath 2017) . Hence, the imagination of the European border regime as a parasitic apparatus of capture highlights, in contrast to the image of the fortress, the incoherence, precarity and unstable nature of this vast security dispositif.
Conclusion
This article develops an alternative political imaginary for the European border regime beyond the much critiqued but still influential image a fortress. The latter is based on a control biased analysis that overrates the coherence and efficiency of border regimes. It is also politically counterproductive because it facilitates paternalistic proxy policies and defensive antiracist politics that make the features of an allegedly omnipotent border regime the reference point of political demands and campaigns. Inspired by the AoM's conception of migration as a constituent force, the article therefore proposes to apprehend the European border regime as a parasitic apparatus of capture that strives on migrants' practices of appropriation as a driving force for its own development. This political imaginary envisions the European border regime as a fragmented and precarious security dispositif which is haunted by the need to recuperate practices of appropriation that escape it's the capacities of existing control mechanisms. It is the insubordination of migrants and their attempts to appropriate mobility within and against contemporary border regimes that force the latter into a permanent process of adaptation and reorganization. Migrants no longer emerge as weak subjects in need of help and support, but as non-negligible actors whose tactics of border-crossing shape, via their recuperation, the form and composition of the mechanisms of control. This is not to suggest that the image of the apparatus of capture accounts for all aspects of contemporary border regimes, or that it is the only adequate figure of thought. As William Walters (2006: 145) (2010) has shown that the proliferation of walls along national demarcation lines should not be taken as signs of unbroken state sovereignty, but rather as symptoms of its decline, the political imaginary of the apparatus of capture invites us to apprehend the resort to increasingly violent and indeed necropolitical forms of border control not as signs of restoration and strength of the European border regime, but as indicators of its increasingly desperate fight for survival.
